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ATHENS/QAMISHLI, Syria: Since 2022, high-ranking Syrian and Turkish politicians have been meeting regularly in Moscow for talks brokered by Russia. But these meetings have not led to an easing of icy relations.

Now, however, the situation is different, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has announced his desire to restore formal relations with his Syrian counterpart Bashar Assad.

Earlier this month, he said he could invite Assad to Turkey “at any time,” to which the Syrian president replied that any meeting would depend on the “content.”

Ankara and Damascus broke off diplomatic relations in 2011 after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war. Since then, relations have remained hostile, particularly because Turkey continues to support armed groups opposing the Assad regime.

Since the outbreak of the civil war in 2011, Turkey has supported armed Syrian groups in their fight against the regime of President Bashar al-Assad. (AFP)

So what is the reason for the current change of course? And what are the likely consequences of a Turkish-Syrian normalization of relations?

Syrian author and political scientist Shoresh Darwish believes that President Erdogan is seeking normalization for two reasons. “The first reason is to prepare for the possibility of a new American administration under Donald Trump, which in turn could mean a return to the policy of (US) withdrawal from Syria,” he told Arab News.

“Erdogan will therefore have to work with Assad and Russia.”

This photo released by the Syrian Arab News Agency shows President Bashar Assad (right) meeting with then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Aleppo. (SANA/AFP)

The second reason, said Darwish, is Erdogan's desire to get closer to Russia, the Syrian regime's ally, after Turkey turned toward the United States following the outbreak of war in Ukraine. As a NATO member state, the conflict has complicated Turkey's normally balanced stance toward Washington and Moscow.

“Ankara's cooperation with Moscow is difficult on the Ukraine issue,” Darwish said. “Due to the West's significant interference in this issue, their cooperation in Syria represents a meeting point with which Erdogan wants to underline his friendship with Putin and Moscow's interests in the Middle East.”

Those in Turkey-backed, opposition-controlled northwest Syria view a rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus as a betrayal.

Protesters in opposition-controlled Idlib and the outskirts of Aleppo wave flags of the Syrian revolution and hold signs reading: “If you want to get closer to Assad, congratulations, the curse of history is on you.” (AN photo by Ali Ali)

In one of the many protests in Idlib since early July, demonstrators held up signs in Arabic that read: “If you want to get closer to Assad, congratulations, the curse of history is upon you.”

Abdulkarim Omar, a political activist from Idlib, told Arab News: “Western Syria, Idlib, the outskirts of Aleppo and all areas belonging to the opposition strongly reject this behavior because it is solely in the interest of the Syrian regime.

“The Syrian people took to the streets 13 years ago and rose up in their revolution to demand freedom, dignity and the establishment of a civil, democratic state for all Syrians. This can only be achieved by overthrowing the tyrannical regime of Bashar al-Assad. They still hold on to this principle and these slogans and cannot give them up.”

Residents of the Kurdish-led, US-backed Autonomous Administration of Northern and Eastern Syria (AANES), which controls much of Syrian territory east of the Euphrates, are also concerned about the consequences of normalization.

Map of Syria showing the control zones of the various participants at the end of 2020. Some cities that were then under the control of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces were captured by Turkish forces. (AFP/File)

“There are fears among the population that reconciliation could be just the beginning of punishment of the Syrian Kurds for their political decisions,” Omar said.

During the 2016-2019 incursions into Syria, Turkey took control of several cities, many of which were previously under AANES control.

Turkey justified its incursions in 2018 and 2019 and its continued presence on Syrian territory with the aim of creating a “safe zone” between itself and the forces of the AANES – the Syrian Democratic Forces.

A member of the Syrian Kurdish security force Asayish stands guard as mourners march during the funeral of two Kurdish women killed in a Turkish drone strike in Hasaka, northeastern Syria, on June 21, 2023. (AFP)

Turkiye considers the SDF to be the Syrian wing of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a group that has been in conflict with the Turkish state since the 1980s.

“Of course, the Syrian Kurds know that they will be part of any agreement that Erdogan wants to make with Assad,” said Darwish. “This issue is unsettling the Syrian Kurds, who believe that Turkey would do anything to harm them and their experience of self-rule.”

Darwish says the Syrian Kurds would accept reconciliation under three conditions. First, they would want Turkey to withdraw its troops from Afrin and Ras Al-Ain. Second, an end to Turkish attacks on AANES areas. And third, a guarantee from the Assad regime “that the Syrian Kurds will enjoy their national, cultural and administrative rights.”

In this January 27, 2018 photo, a Turkish military convoy drives through the Oncupinar border crossing as troops enter Syria as part of a military campaign in the Kurdish-held Syrian enclave of Afrin. (AFP/File)

But how likely is a rapprochement between Ankara and Damascus? Not very, says conflict analyst and UNHRC delegate Thoreau Redcrow. “I think the prospects of a detente between Erdogan and Assad are very unlikely,” he told Arab News.

“Historically, Turkey's ideas of 'normalization' with Syria have amounted to a policy of unilateral influence in favor of Ankara. Under this agreement, Turkey continues to occupy Hatay (Liwa Iskenderun), which it conquered from Syria in 1938, and demands military intervention in its sovereignty, as in the 1998 Adana Agreement, but without delivering anything in return.”

Assad has made it clear in public statements that a meeting between him and Erdogan would only take place on the condition of a Turkish withdrawal from Syria. Redcrow believes that Turkey has no intention of leaving the country.

“I can't imagine Damascus being interested in being manipulated for a photo shoot,” he said. “The Syrian government is far more proud than some of the other regional players who are happy to be one of Turkey's 'neo-Ottoman vilayets.'”

Erdogan may be trying to capitalize on the trend toward normalizing relations among Arab countries that began last year with Syria's readmission to the Arab League, but European states and the United States remain divided.

Syrian female soldiers parade in an opposition-controlled area in northern Syria. (AN photo by Ali Ali)

“While Germany, France, Italy and the UK in particular are more focused on how Turkey can control the gateway to Europe and act as a 'continental gatekeeper' for refugees from the Middle East and West Asia, the US is more focused on denying Russia and Iran full access to all of Syria for strategic reasons, such as access to the Mediterranean and the 'Shiite land bridge' from Tehran to Beirut,” Redcrow said.

“The current status quo is far more advantageous for Washington than any reconciliation, as it would also endanger the northeastern part of Syria, where the US military is embedded with its most reliable military partners against Daesh in the SDF. So Turkey would not be given any green light to jeopardize American interests.”

The U.S. House of Representatives passed the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act of 2023 in February, which prohibits any normalization of relations with Assad. In a July 12 post on social media platform X, the bill's author, Rep. Joe Wilson, expressed disappointment with Erdogan's calls for normalization, comparing them to “normalizing with death itself.”

Even though the prospects for a successful reconciliation are currently slim, the approximately 3.18 million Syrian refugees in Turkey view even rumors of a normalization of relations with fear and terror.

“People are very afraid,” Amal Hayat, a Syrian mother of five living in southeastern Turkey, told Arab News. “Since the rumors (of reconciliation) started, many people do not even leave their homes. Even if they are beaten by their bosses at work, they are afraid to say anything for fear of being deported.”

A Syrian woman in a refugee camp near the Syrian-Turkish border. (AN photo by Ali Ali)

According to Human Rights Watch, Turkish authorities deported more than 57,000 Syrians in 2023.

“A forced return would hit us hard,” says Hayat. “For example, if a woman returns to Syria with her family, her husband can be arrested by the regime. Or if a man is deported to Syria and his wife and children remain in Turkey, how are they supposed to cope? That is difficult. Here our children can study. They have stability and security.”

Fears of deportations have been heightened by the waves of violence against Syrian refugees that have rocked southern Turkey in recent weeks. On June 30, residents of the central Turkish province of Kayseri attacked Syrians and their property.

The anti-Syrian sentiment in Turkey has partly economic reasons: Turks see underpaid or unpaid Syrians as a threat to their employment prospects.

“The Turks are very happy that we are returning home,” Hayat said. “For them, it is not soon enough. We are all living under increased stress. We just pray that (Assad and Erdogan) do not reconcile.”

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